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I. INTRODUCTION
While the primary purpose of commercial advertising has always
been to promote the purchase of goods and services, the means that
advertisers have used to reach this end have varied over time. Until
recently, sellers tended to limit their advertisements to statements of
the qualities possessed by their own products. Consumers were ex-
pected to infer superiority over competing brands, the names of which
were rarely mentioned. As the public has become more sophisticated in
its appreciation of the media, advertisers have adopted new, aggressive,
and more competitive techniques.
Today's advertisements often ask prospective buyers to accept "fac-
tual" statements and surveys about named competing products. While
accurate product comparisons can be of immense value, comparisons
which are flawed in the underlying methodology or which present only
incomplete information can be misleading and injurious.2
Two groups are injured by misleading advertisements. One group is
consumers who, in making their choice among competing goods, do not
receive the product for which they bargain. When the misrepresented
goods are inexpensive, the monetary injury to this group will be slight
and easily minimized as consumers will purchase other competing prod-
ucts in the future. When the goods are more expensive or there is a
likelihood of nonmonetary injuries, the need for consumer redress is
more pressing.
' It was not until the mid-1970's that the era of polite, no-names-mentioned advertis-
ing came to an end. The Federal Trade Commission's encouragement of comparative adver-
tising was a significant force in bringing this head-to-head competition to the forefront of
marketing tools. See 16 C.F.R. § 14.15 (1982). This change in advertising styles has prompted
the significant increase in litigation in the unfair advertising area discussed in this article.
See Tylenol, the Painkiller, Gives Rivals Headache in Stores and in Court, Wall St. J.,
Sept. 2, 1982, at 1. Most recently, significant interest and litigation have been generated by
comparative advertising in the fast-food restaurant industry. See McDonald's Corp. v.
Burger King Corp., No. 82-2605 (S.D. Fla. 1982); Wendy's Int'l Inc. v. Burger King Corp., No.
C-2-82-1175 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
' See, e.g., Vidal Sassoon, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Co., 661 F.2d 272 (2d Cir. 1981)
(misrepresenting findings of surveys); R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Loew's Theatres, Inc.,
511 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (improper methodology of survey).
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The other injured group is competitors. When a misrepresentation
relates solely to qualities possessed by the advertised products, as op-
posed to the inferiority of named competing brands, all producers in the
market share the monetary injury. When particular products are singled
out as being inferior, however, the makers of those goods absorb the full
injury thus giving them special need for relief.
Despite the injury which can result from false advertising, the Chair-
man of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC or Commission), the head of
an agency which for a considerable time was at the forefront of efforts to
curb deceptive advertising, has recently expressed his intent to en-
courage the FTC not to regulate actively in this area. According to FTC
Chairman James Miller, the Commission should only challenge ads that
pose a threat of significant injury to the public and that cannot be cured
by market forces. If Chairman Miller successfully implements this ap-
proach, FTC involvement will be the exception. The practical result will
be that businesses and consumers will be required to rely almost ex-
clusively on private remedies to counter an increase in misleading adver-
tisements.'
A. The Common Law: A Brief Review
The common-law causes of actions available to consumers and com-
petitors are limited and difficult to prove. Consumers generally have a
claim only for common-law fraud.4 A competitor, whose product is ex-
pressly misrepresented, may only bring an action for commercial dispar-
agement.' Claims of fraud or disparagement, however, are especially dif-
See J. Miller, Remarks Before the American Advertising Federation, Washington,
D.C. (Dec. 8, 1981); Miller's Tale-A Fresh Look at the FTC, BARRONS, Aug. 30, 1982, at 27;
Ad Constraints Could Persist Even If the FTC Loosens Up, Wall St. J., Dec. 10, 1981, at 33;
see also Wash. Post, Jan. 11, 1983, at A13 (suggesting that Miller has been successful in ad-
vocating his view). Although there has been a decrease in FTC false advertising complaints
since Chairman Miller's seven year term began in September 1981, the FTC has recently
challenged advertisements by the manufacturer of Amana microwave ovens. The FTC has.
specifically challenged the manufacturer's representation in ads run in 1980 that Amana
was the only brand to pass all government safety tests. See Complaint Dkt. 9162, TRADE
REG. REP. (CCH) 21,964 (Oct. 7, 1982); Wash. Post, Oct. 9, 1982, at F9.
There is no private right of action for violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
See Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593 (1925); Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp.,
485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
1 Some states have enacted statutes known as "Little FTC Acts" that in some in-
stances give consumers standing to challenge misleading advertising. See Leaffer & Lipson,
Consumer Actions Against Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices: the Private Uses of
Federal Trade Commission Jurisprudence, 48 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 521,(1980).
' See Gaughan, Advertisements Which Identify "Brand X'" A Trialogue on the Law
and Policy, 35 FORDHAM L. REV. 445 (1967); Comment, The Law of Commercial Disparage-
ment: Business Defamation's Impotent Ally, 63 YALE L.J. 65 (1953).
Commercial disparagement arises when one makes a false assertion which impugns the'
quality of another's product with intent to injure the manufacturer's business. See
Gaughan, supra, at 447 n.4. Mere seller's puffery would not constitute disparagement. See
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ficult to sustain because each requires proof of scienter on the part of
the defendant.' Moreover, access to a federal court under these common-
law theories are limited to instances involving diversity or pendent
jurisdiction. Further, where a competitor misrepresents the qualities of his
own goods without directly disparaging a competing product, the com-
petitor has no common-law right of action against the false advertiser.7
B. Section 43: A Federal Statutory Remedy
A private remedy for misleading advertising is, however, provided
by one federal statute-section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.' This section
grants a statutory remedy for false advertising without the constraints
of the common-law causes of action.9 While section 43(a) is part of a
Testing Sys., Inc. v. Magnaflux Corp., 251 F. Supp. 286, 288 (E.D. Pa. 1966); W. PROSSER & J.
WADE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 1007 (5th ed. 1971).
A competitor has an additional cause of action based upon the common-law prohibition
of "palming off" if the defendant has represented his product as being of the competitor's
make. See infra note 12.
, See Brayton Chems., Inc. v. First Farmers State Bank of Minier, 671 F.2d 1047 (7th
Cir. 1982); Santana, Inc. v. Levi Strauss and Co., 674 F.2d 269 (4th Cir. 1982); Western Con-
tracting Corp. v. Dow Chem. Co., 664 F.2d 1097 (8th Cir. 1981); G. ALEXANDER, COMMERCIAL
TORTS § 5.1 (1973). The plaintiff in a commercial disparagement case will have the additional
burden of proving actual damages. See Scott Paper Co. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 343 F.
Supp. 229, 233 (E.D. Wis. 1972); Note, The Law of Comparative Advertising: How Much
Worse Is "Better" Than "Great"?, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 80 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Com-
parative Advertising].
A cause of action similar to disparagement is defamation. There have been only a few
instances in which courts have allowed defamation actions in this context. See Cosgrove
Studio and Camera Shop, Inc. v. Paine, 408 Pa. 314, 182 A.2d 751 (1962); Note, Corporate
Defamation and Product Disparagement: Narrowing the Analogy to Personal Defamation,
75 COLUM. L. REV. 963 (1975). Defamation actions, unlike disparagement actions, do not re-
quire proof of special damages. See Comparative Advertising, supra, at 83 n.17. But see
Gertz v. Robert Welsh, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (special damages might be required in
defamation actions).
See, e.g., American Washboard Co. v. Saginaw Mfg. Co., 103 F. 281 (6th Cir. 1900);
Derenberg, Federal Unfair Competition Law at the End of the First Decade of the Lanham
Act: Prologue or Epilogue?, 32 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1029 (1957); infra text accompanying notes
11-14.
, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976). Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides that:
Any person who shall.., use in connection with any goods ... any false descrip-
tion or representation, including words or symbols tending falsely to describe or
represent the same, and shall cause such goods or services to enter into commerce
... shall be liable to a civil action by ... any person who believes that he is or is
likely to be damaged by the use of any such false description or representation.
Id.
, There are two especially significant differences between the 'common law and § 43(a)
of the Lanham Act. First, § 43(a) provides a remedy where there is no palming off, see infra
note 12, or disparagement. Second, intent to deceive is not required under § 43(a). See, e.g..
Better Business Bureau of Metro. Houston, Inc. v. Medical Directors, Inc., 509 F. Supp. 811
(S.D. Tex. 1981), modified, 681 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1982); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders v.
Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 467 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979); Inter-
[Vol. 40:383
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larger framework primarily aimed at the regulation of trademark usage,
it has created a federal statutory remedy for various types of unfair
advertising not limited to trademark abuse."0 Although the section was
initially applied restrictively, a more liberal reading of the statute has
developed in recent years. The full extent of the relief available under
the statute has not yet been realized.
Sections II and III of this article review the history of section 43(a)
and the various issues that have arisen in its application. The remainder
of the article analyzes the most recent use of the Lanham Act in the con-
text of comparative advertising.
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. Effect of Judicial Precedent
Two areas of judicial development led to the passage of the Lanham
Act. The first area was a line of decisions following the seminal case of
American Washboard Co. v. Saginaw Manufacturing Co. 1 American's
washboards had gained significant popularity among consumers because
they were made of aluminum. American Washboard, the plaintiff in this
action, sought to enjoin Saginaw from representing that Saginaw's
galvanized iron washboards were made of aluminum. Because Saginaw
had not attempted to misrepresent its products as the plaintiff's, a cause
of action for "palming off" could not be sustained. 2 Instead, the plaintiff
national Election Sys. Corp. v. Shoup, 452 F. Supp. 684 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd, 595 F.2d 1212
(3d Cir. 1979); infra text accompanying notes 44-57.
" See, e.g., SK&F, Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Lab., Inc., 625 F.2d 1055, 1065 (3d Cir.
1980); Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D. N.J. 1981); CBS Inc. v. Springboard
Int'l Records, 429 F. Supp. 563 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Skil Corp. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 375 F.
Supp. 777 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Ames Publishing Co. v. Walker-Davis Publications, 372 F. Supp. 1
(E.D. Pa. 1974); Franklin Mint, Inc. v. Franklin Mint, Ltd., 331 F. Supp. 827, 831 (E.D. Pa.
1971).
103 F. 281 (6th Cir. 1900).
II "Palming off' is "an attempt by one person to induce customers to believe that his
products are actually those of his competitors." Remco Indus., Inc. v. Toyomenka, Inc., 286
F. Supp. 948, 954, affd, 397 F.2d 977 (2d Cir. 1968). See also Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964); Pic Design Corp. v. Bearings Speciality Co., 436 F.2d 804
(1st Cir. 1971); Bose Corp. v. Linear Design Labs, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 513, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1971),
modified, 467 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1972); The Coca-Cola Co. v. Dorris, 311 F. Supp. 287, 289
(E.D. Ark. 1970). Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938), the federal courts, applying federal common law, had developed an expansive
palming off doctrine for protection of competitors. See S.S. Kresge Co. v. Champion Spark
Plug Co., 3 F.2d 415 (6th Cir. 1925); 84 A.L.R. 472 (1933). The Erie case extinguished this
line of authority by requiring the federal courts to look solely at the various states' palming
off jurisprudence, a body of law less developed than the federal doctrine. See Time, Inc. v.
Viobin Corp., 128 F.2d 860, 863 (7th Cir. 1942), cerL denied, 317 U.S. 673 (1942), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Philco Co. v. Phillips Mfg. Co., 133 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1943). The
Lanham Act, which prohibits palming off, is more favorable to plaintiffs than the federal
common-law doctrine. See, e.g., Black Hills Jewelry Mfg. Co. v. Gold Rush, Inc., 633 F.2d
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alleged only that the defendant was deceiving the public-an allegation
that did not come within any traditional common-law action for which
the plaintiff had standing.
The Sixth Circuit upheld a dismissal of the complaint. The court
reasoned that the defendant had not infringed upon a "property right"
held by the plaintiff, such as a trademark, and that lost future sales were
not "property." Thus, the plaintiff had not alleged an injury that a court
of equity could protect. 3 The court was especially concerned with the
plaintiffs inability to show that it had lost sales by a misrepresentation
not expressly directed at American Washboard.
The American Washboard result was consistent with views on stand-
ing prevailing at that time. Because the plaintiff failed to allege an in-
jury that was cognizable in equity, it lacked standing to seek an injunc-
tion. The court held that if persons such as the plaintiff were to be given
standing to prevent deceptive advertising it "must come from the
legislature, and not from the courts."
Twenty-seven years later, the Supreme Court reached a similar,
although slightly more expansive result, in Mosler Safe Co. v. Ely-Norris
Safe Co." The plaintiff in Mosler manufactured safes with an explosion
chamber for protection against burglars. The defendant falsely
represented that its safes had explosion chambers. The plaintiff admit-
ted that the defendant never gave any customer reason to believe that
its products were of the plaintiff's make. Following American
Washboard, the district court held that the defendant's misrepresenta-
tions did not give the plaintiff a private cause of action. The Second Cir-
cuit, per Judge Learned Hand, reversed, reasoning that because the
complaint alleged that the plaintiff had a patent monopoly on the safes
with exploding chambers, a situation not present in. American
746 (8th Cir. 1980); L&L White Metal Casting Corp. v. Joseph, 387 F. Supp. 1349 (E.D.N.Y.
1976). For cases finding no palming off under the Lanham Act, however, see Vibrant Sales,
Inc. v. New Body Boutique, Inc., 652 F.2d 299 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 909 (1981);
Hesmer Foods, Inc. v. Campbell Soup Co., 346 F.2d 356 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 839
(1965).
3 The American Washboard court set forth the then prevailing law:
From the general principle running through [the precedent] it may be said that
when one has established a trade or business in which he has used a particular
device, symbol, or name so that it has become known in trade as a designation of
such person's goods, equity will protect him in the use thereof. Such person has a
right to complain when another adopts this symbol or manner of marking his
goods so as to mislead the public into purchasing the same as and for the goods of
complainant. Plaintiff comes into a court of equity in such cases for the protection
of his property rights. The private action is given, not for the benefit of the public,
although that may be its incidental effect, but because of the invasion by defendant
of that which is the exclusive property of complainant.
103 F. at 284.
Id. at 286.
'5 273 U.S. 132 (1927).
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Washboard, any sale by the defendant was a lost sale to the plaintiff."6
The Second Circuit held that this constituted a cognizable injury."T
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Holmes, reversed the
Second Circuit."8 The reversal, however, was not a rejection of Judge
Hand's legal reasoning but rather was based on the Supreme Court's
reading of the complaint, supplemented by defendant's oral argument,
which indicated that the plaintiff did not have a monopoly on safes with
exploding chambers. 9 Absent a monopoly, the plaintiff could not prove
any injury and accordingly lacked standing.
The common-law rule in 1927, therefore, was that competitors had no
standing to enjoin nondisparaging, deceptive advertising outside the
palming off context unless the plaintiff had a monopoly position in the
market such that sales were necessarily decreased by the deception. The
impact of this restrictive rule was particularly far-reaching in the inter-
national sphere. Subsequent to Mosler, the United States became a
signatory to the Inter-American Trademark Convention of 1929.1o The
convention obligated the United States to provide effective legal protec-
tion against many different forms of unfair practices in international
trade not prohibited under American common law. Most foreign
signatories had laws granting competitors much greater rights against
misleading advertising than were available in the United States." The
inability of foreign signatories to obtain relief under the American
Washboard rule, while foreign laws gave American competitors greater
rights, was one prime motivation for the enactment of the Lanham Act.2
The second judicial development that prompted the Lanham Act
"6 See Mosler Safe Co. v. Ely-Norris Safe Co., 7 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1925), rev'd, 273 U.S.
132 (1927).
17 See 7 F.2d at 604. Judge Hand in Mosler described the rationale for American
Washboard and its progeny as follows:
In the case at bar the means are as plainly unlawful as in the usual case of palming
off. It is as unlawful to lie about the quality of one's wares as about their maker; it
equally subjects the seller to action by the buyer .... The reason, as we think,
why such deceits have not been regarded as actionable by a competitor, depends
only upon his inability to show any injury for which there is a known remedy. In
an open market it is generally impossible to prove that a customer, whom the
defendant has secured by falsely describing his goods, would have bought of the
plaintiff, if the defendant had been truthful. Without that, the plaintiff, though ag-
grieved in company with other honest traders, cannot show any ascertainable
loss. He may not recover at law, and the equitable remedy is concurrent. The law
does not allow him to sue as a vicarious avenger of the defendant's customers.
Id.
18 See 273 U.S. 132 (1927).
19 See id. at 133-34.
See 46 Stat. 2907, T.S. No. 833 (1929).
21 See Derenberg, supra note 7, at 1036-38.
= See Skil Corp. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 375 F. Supp. 777 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Derenberg,
supra note 7, at 1029, 1036-38.
One witness at a congressional hearing on the Lanham Act emphasized that it was
1983]
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was the Supreme Court's decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.'
Prior to Erie, the federal courts had primarily developed the common
law of unfair trade practices.2 In Erie, however, the Court held that "ex-
cept in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Con-
gress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State."' This
decision swept aside the protection provided by federal decisions in the
area of palming off and abrogated any hope that the liberal trend em-
bodied in Judge Hand's Mosler decision would become the law.26
During hearings on the proposed Lanham Act, a major concern of
legislators was to provide a statutory basis for continuing the liberal
trend of the federal common law prior to Erie.' It was recognized at the
time of passage of the Lanham Act that, given any statutory framework
in the area, counsel and courts would revive the federal common-law
rules as part of the interpretation of the legislation." This legislative
history has prompted courts to hold that a purpose of the Lanham Act
was to remedy the destructive effect the Erie doctrine had upon the
development of a uniform federal law on misleading advertising.'
Congress' reaction to American Washboard and Erie is important to
the present construction of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act in two
respects. First, Congress' response indicates an intent to give com-
petitors standing broader than that available under American Wash-
board and more in line with that available in foreign countries with
whom the United States had trade treaties. Second, Congress' reaction
indicates endorsement of progressive regulation of trade advertising as
represented by the federal common-law prohibition on palming off.30
misleading to tell foreign nations that the United States would provide effective protection
for unfair competition:
By all the conventions we undertake to grant to foreigners effective protection
against unfair competition. The foreigner says, "What have you given us?" And
the answer usually is, "There is the Federal Trade Commission Act." Well, what
is that? That is only unfair competition that directly affects the public. Then you
talk to a foreigner about the common law, and he says, "What is that? We haven't
any such thing in our country." And then we try to explain that there are 48
varieties of common law in the United States, and he says, "Which one is the one
that I am entitled to be protected under? There is no Federal statute that helps
me."
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Trade-Marks of the House Comm. on Patents, 76th
Cong., 1st Sess. 164 (1939). See infra text accompanying notes 27-30.
23 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2 See American Consumers, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 416 F. Supp. 1210 (E.D. Tenn. 1976).
304 U.S. at 78.
See Zlinkoff, Erie v. Tompkins: In Relation to the Law of Trademarks and Unfair
Competition, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 955, 960 (1942).
' See Derenberg, supra note 7, at 1030.
28 See Zlinkoff, supra note 26, at 972.
See Skil Corp. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 375 F. Supp. 777 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
See Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538, 545-47 (2d
Cir. 1956) (Clark, C.J., concurring).
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B. Legislative History of Section 43(a)
The Lanham Act was enacted on July 5, 1946.1' The Act is intended
primarily to regulate the registration of trademarks.32 Section 43(a)'s
broad regulatory impact can be traced to section 3 of the 1920 Trade-
mark Act.' Section 3 of the 1920 Act was the first federal legislation pro-
viding a private cause of action against a form of unfair competition not
resulting from the infringement of a registered trademark.' Section 3
was limited in four ways. First, section 3 required that any false designa-
tion be made "willfully and with an intent to deceive." Second, the
misrepresentation had to relate to a false designation of origin; any
other misrepresentation was not actionable. Third, the section was
SI See ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (currently codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1976)).
Section 45 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1976), states that:
The intent of this Act is to regulate commerce within the control of Congress by
making actionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks in such commerce;
to protect registered marks used in such commerce from interference by State, or
territorial legislation; to protect persons engaged in such commerce against unfair
competition; to prevent fraud and deception in such commerce by the use of
reproductions, copies, counterfeits, or colorable imitations of registered marks;
and to provide rights and remedies stipulated by treaties and conventions respect-
ing trade-marks, trade names, and unfair competition entered into between the
United States and foreign nations.
' Ch. 104, § 3, 41 Stat. 533 (1920), repealed by the Lanham Act, ch. 540, § 46(a), 60 Star.
444 (1946). The purpose of the Trademark Act of 1920 was to implement certain provisions
of the Buenos Aires Convention of 1910. Article VIII of the Convention states:
The falsification, imitation or unauthorized use of a trade-mark, as also the false
representation as to the origin of a product, shall be prosecuted by the interested
party in accordance with the laws of the State where the offence is committed.
For the effects of this article, interested parties shall be understood to be any pro-
ducer, manufacturer, or merchant engaged in the production, manufacture or traf-
fic of said product, or in the case of false representation of origin, one doing
business in the locality falsely indicated as that of origin, or in the territory [in]
which said locality is situated.
39 Stat. 1678-79, T.S. No. 626 (1916).
s' Section 3 of the 1920 Trademark Act read as follows:
That any person who shall willfully and with intent to deceive, affix, apply, or an-
nex, or use in connection with any article or articles of merchandise, or any con-
tainer or containers of the same, a false designation of origin, including words or
other symbols, tending to falsely identify the origin of the merchandise, and shall
then cause such merchandise to enter into interstate or foreign commerce, and
any person who shall knowingly cause or procure the same to be transported in in-
terstate or foreign commerce or commerce with Indian tribes, or shall knowingly
deliver the same to any carrier to be so transported, shall be liable to an action at
law for damages and to an action in equity for an injunction, at the suit of any per-
son, firm, or corporation doing business in the locality falsely indicated as that of
origin, or in the region in which said locality is situated, or at the suit of any
association of such persons, firms or corporations.
Oh. 104, § 3, 41 Stat. 533 (1920), repealed by the Lanham Act, ch. 540, § 46(a), 60 Stat. 444
(1946). There was apparently little debate on this section and there were almost no reported
decisions interpreting it. See Derenberg, supra note 7, at 1034.
1983]
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limited to misrepresentations pertaining to "articles"; services were not
included. Fourth, standing was limited to those actually injured.
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act35 does not have the limitations of
section 3 of the Trademark Act. Thus, section 43(a) has been interpreted
by many courts as a broad and remedial statute aimed at expanding the
standing of competitors.
38
C. Early Advertising Cases Under Section 43(a)
Decisions immediately following the passage of the Lanham Act in-
terpreted section 43(a) as little more than a codification of the federal
common-law rule of American Washboard; causes of action were limited
to cases in which property rights were affected. The earliest of these
cases was Samson Crane Co. v. Union National Sales, Inc." The plaintiff
in Samson sought to use section 43(a) to enjoin the defendant, a com-
petitor, from misrepresenting that the defendant's store was being
operated by and for the benefit of unions. The district court, in an opin-
ion still relied on today, rejected the section 43(a) claim.
The Samson court first stated that, while section 43(a) literally pro-
hibits "any false description or representation," the statutory language
must be interpreted "in light of the succeeding phrase which explains
these words as including words or symbols tending falsely to describe or
represent, not any fact, but the goods or services in connection with
which the description or representation is used."38 Thus, the court
reasoned that the literal language was not controlling.39
Relying on the same rationale, the Samson court minimized the im-
portance of the Lanham Act's intent-"to protect persons engaged in
commerce against unfair competition."4" The court noted that this phrase
was the only one in the statement of intent which failed to use the word
"'mark." The court reasoned that, when the phrase is read in context, the
unfair competition referred to must be closely associated with a misuse
of trademarks - "the passing off of one's own goods as those of a competi-
tor."" Thus, the Samson court concluded that:
[T]he section should be construed to include only such false
See 11 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976); supra text accompanying note 9.
See, e.g., CBS Inc. v. Springboard Int'l Records, 429 F. Supp. 563, 566 (S.D.N.Y.
1976) ("The section is clearly remedial and should be broadly construed"); Skil Corp. v.
Rockwell Int'l Corp., 375 F. Supp. 777 (N.D. Ill. 1974); S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess.
1-5, reprinted in 1946 U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 1274-77.
8 57 F. Supp. 218 (D. Mass. 1949), affd per curiam, 180 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1950).
Id. at 221.
See id. at 221-22 (referring to the phrase in § 43(a) which indicates that false
representation includes "words or symbols tending falsely to describe or represent the"
defendant's goods).
40 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1976).
4' 87 F. Supp. at 222.
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descriptions or representations as are of substantially the same
economic nature as those which involve infringement, or other
improper use of trade-marks. It should not be interpreted so as
to bring within its scope any kind of undesirable business prac-
tice which involves deception, when such practices are outside
the field of the trademark laws, and especially when such
undesirable practices are already the subject of other Congres-
sional legislation such as the Federal Trade Commission Act.4"
This narrow reading of section 43(a) was based upon a close examination
of the statutory structure of the legislation.
The Ninth Circuit, in Chamberlain v. Columbia Pictures Corp.,
43
reached a similarly narrow interpretation by treating section 43(a) as a
mere codification of the federal common law in existence in 1946. The
defendant in Chamberlain was alleged to have advertised a motion pic-
ture in such a manner as to deceive consumers into believing that the
script was written by Mark Twain. The plaintiff, who claimed all rights
possessed by Mark Twain at the time of his death, brought suit under
section 43(a). The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, holding in
language strikingly similar to that used in American Washboard, that in
order to state a cause of action under section 43(a), there must be "a
direct injury to the property right of a complainant by passing off the
particular goods or services misrepresented.""
On the basis of Samson and Chamberlain, defendants frequently
argue that section 43(a) did not alter the substantive law as it existed
before passage of the Lanham Act but merely broadened the jurisdiction
of federal courts to allow a private party to advance a palming off claim
without showing diversity. This argument requires that the plaintiff
show direct injury to a property right in order to obtain relief.
45
42 Id. The Samson court's reference to the FTC Act does not justify its decision. The
mere presence of legislation which could be used to prevent unfair advertising should not be
used to support a reading of § 43(a) contrary to its literal meaning. This is especially true
since the FTC appears to be generally following Chairman Miller's desire to limit its in-
volvement in the unfair advertising area and the courts have generally held that there is no
private right of action under the FTC Act. See Alfred Dunhill Ltd. v. Interstate Cigar Co.,
499 F.2d 232, 237 (2d Cir. 1974) (no private right of action under FTC Act); supra note 3.
186 F.2d 923 (9th Cir. 1951).
" Id. at 925. The Chamberlain court stated that:
Deceiving the public by fraudulent means, while an important factor in such suit
[under § 43(a)], does not give the right of action unless it results in the sale of the
goods as those of the complainant.
Id. The facts of Chamberlain are analogous to traditional palming off (ie., the script was
passed off as being written by Mark Twain). Thus, the Chamberlain court could have found
§ 43(a) applicable even under its narrow construction of the statute that § 43(a) applies only
to palming off.
" See, e.g., Gold Seal Co. v. Weeks, 129 F. Supp. 928 (D.D.C. 1955), affd sub nom. S.C.
Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Gold Seal Co., 230 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 829
(1956).
.1983]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
During the 1960's, both the Sixth" and Seventh47 Circuits, relying on
Samson and Chamberlain, expressed approval of this argument; lower
courts in those circuits have continued to follow the courts of appeals'
decisions as controlling precedent." The present trend among other
courts, however, is toward a construction of section 43(a) that provides a
cause of action whenever there has been a "false description or
representation" regardless of the misrepresentation's resemblance to
the traditional palming off.49
D. Current Trends of Advertising Cases Under Section 43(a)
The first court to hold that section 43(a) could be applied to
misrepresentations other than palming off was the Third Circuit in
L 'Aiglon Appare4 Inc. v. Lana Lobel1 Inc." The plaintiff in L 'Aiglon was
the manufacturer of a popular dress that sold for $17.95. The defendant
sold an inferior and differently styled mail order dress for $6.95. In
advertisements for the defendant's dress, however, the defendant used
photographs of the plaintiff's garment. Since the defendant did not ex-
pressly represent that he was selling the plaintiff's product, the plaintiff
could not argue that palming off had occurred.
51
Despite the continued vitality of the American Washboard line of
4" See Federal-Mogul-Bower Bearings, Inc. v. Azoff, 313 F.2d 405 (6th Cir. 1963) (exten-
sively quoting from Samson).
47 See Bernard Food Indus., Inc. v. Dietene Co., 415 F.2d 1279, 1283 (7th Cir. 1969); in-
fra text accompanying notes 131-40. See also General Pool Corp. v. Hallmark Pool Corp., 259
F. Supp. 383 (N.D. Ill. 1966).
41 See, e.g., American Consumers, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 416 F. Supp. 1210 (E.D. Tenn.
1976); Vermilion Foam Prods. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 386 F. Supp. 255 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
But see Electronics Corp. of America v. Honeywell Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1230 (D. Mass.), affd,
487 F.2d 513 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974); Quabau Rubber Co. v. Fabiano
Shoe Co., 567 F.2d 154 (1st Cir. 1977) ("[Section 43(a)] does not have a boundless application
as a remedy for unfair trade practices").
" See, e.g., Vidal Sassoon, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Co., 661 F.2d 272 (2d Cir. 1981);
Ragold, Inc. v. Ferrero, U.S.A., Inc., 506 F. Supp. 117 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Fox Chem. Co. v. Am-
soil, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 1355 (D. Minn. 1978); Gold Seal Co. v. Weeks, 129 F. Supp. 928 (D.D.C.
1955), affd sub nom. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Gold Seal Co., 230 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 829 (1956). See also L & L White Metal Casting Corp. v. Joseph, 387 F.
Supp. 1349 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Natcontainer Corp. v. Continental Can Co., 362 F. Supp. 1094
(S.D.N.Y. 1973). In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 473 F. Supp. 393 (N.D. Ill. 1979), contains
the most expansive reading of the Lanham Act. In that case the district court refused to
dismiss a § 43(a) claim based upon alleged misrepresentations made by the defendant in
negotiations with consumers for whose business the plaintiff was competing. See also
Chromium Indus., Inc. v. Mirror Polishing & Plating Co., 448 F. Supp. 544 (N.D. Ill. 1978)
(Lanham Act held to cover a seller's exaggeration of the scope of its patents); H.A. Friend
and Co. v. Friend and Co., 276 F. Supp. 707 (C.D. Cal. 1967), aff'd, 416 F.2d 526 (9th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 914 (1970).
'0 214 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1954). For a more recent case involving facts similar to
L'Aiglon see Matsushita Elec. Corp. of America v. Solar Sound Sys., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 64
(S.D.N.Y. 1974).
11 214 F.2d at 650.
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cases, as shown by Samson and Chamberlain, the L'Aiglon court noted
that a more liberal interpretation had strong adherents, as reflected in
section 761 of the Restatement of Torts.52 The keystone of the Third Cir-
cuit's rationale, however, was not the Restatement. Instead the court
turned to the language of section 43(a) itself as a basis for its decision.
The court found no words limiting causes of action for false representa-
tion to palming off or trademark infringement. Thus, the court felt
bound to construe section 43(a) as a new federal statutory tort with
broader implications than the American Washboard rule.53
For fifteen years, the Third Circuit's decision in L 'Aiglon was the ex-
ception.-' Within the last decade, however, other courts have adopted
this broader reading. The Fifth Circuit in Alum-A-Fold Shutter Corp. v.
Folding Shutter Corp.,' the Second Circuit in Alfred Dunhill Ltd. v. In-
terstate Cigar Co.,56 and the Eighth Circuit in Potato Chip Institute v.
General Mills, Inc.5 ' have each adopted the L'Aiglon rationale rather
than the narrow construction advanced in Samson and Chamberlain.
Even district courts in circuits with prior appellate court opinions
following Samson have now adopted L'Aiglon. The Ninth Circuit in
U-Haul International Inc. v. Jartran, Inc.59 has recently adopted the
L'Aiglon ruling, distinguishing its prior decision in Chamberlain.
I See id. at 651. Section 761(a) of the Restatement of Torts states that:
One who diverts trade from a competitor by fraudulently representing that the
goods which he markets have ingredients or qualities which in fact they do not
have but which the goods of the competitor do have, is liable to the competitor for
the harm so caused, if (a) when making the representation he intends that it
should, or knows or should know that it is likely to, divert trade from the com-
petitor ....
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 761(a) (1934).
1 See 214 F.2d at 650-51. See also American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63
(1982) (Courts bound to follow literal words of act absent legislative history to the contrary).
But see Gold Seal Co. v. Weeks, 129 F. Supp. 928 (D.D.C. 1955), affd sub nom. S.C.
Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Gold Seal Co., 230 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 829
(1956). The Gold Seal district court expressly adopted L'Aiglon.
" 441 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1971). See also Better Business Bureau of Metro. Houston, Inc.
v. Medical Directors, Inc., 509 F. Supp. 811 (S.D. Tex. 1981), modified, 681 F.2d 397 (5th Cir.
1982). Curiously, the Fifth Circuit in Alum-A-Fold failed to distinguish between the dif-
ferent holdings in Samson and L Aiglon, treating both cases as supporting the proposition
that a new and broader statutory tort had been created. See 441 F.2d at 557.
18 499 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1974). See infra text accompanying notes 124-30; see also
Bowmar Instrument Corp. v. Continental Microsystems, Inc., 497 F. Supp. 947 (S.D.N.Y.
1980); Benson v. Paul Winley Records Sales Corp., 452 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
17 333 F. Supp. 173 (D. Neb. 1971), affd, 461 F.2d 1088 (8th Cir. 1972).
" See Skil Corp. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 375 F. Supp. 777 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (ignoring the
Seventh Circuit's opinion in Bernard Food Indus., Inc. v. Dietene Co., 415 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir.
1969), and quoting at length from the passages in Samson expressing a contrary view).
5' 681 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir. 1982). The Ninth Circuit implicitly adopted L'Aiglon in its
earlier decision in Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1981). The Smith court relied
primarily on commentators, see, e.g., 2 J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETI-
TION § 25.1 (1973), and lower court opinions, see, e.g., L & L White Metal Casting Corp. v.
Joseph, 387 F. Supp. 1349 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
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Under traditional rules of statutory construction, the rationale of
L'Aiglon and its progeny represents the more coherent view. First,
under established precedent, including the most recent Supreme Court
statements on the point, courts are bound to give effect to the literal
words of a statute unless the words are ambiguous or lead to an irra-
tional result."0 As the L'Aiglon court emphasized, the literal words of
section 43(a) are not limited to palming off but include any "false descrip-
tion or representation." There is no ambiguity in this phrase.
Second, the L'Aiglon decision is faithful to the congressional intent
of the Lanham Act as revealed in the Act's legislative history. It is not
plausible that Congress intended by section 43(a) to freeze the liberal
trend developing in the courts, particularly since the Supreme Court's
decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins is viewed as a catalyst for Con-
gress' enactment of the Lanham Act. Rather, this history indicates that
the statute was intended to broaden the common law and so bring
American law in line with that of foreign signatories to trade conven-
tions with the United States. 1 The change in the language from that of
section 3 of the Trademark Act of 1920, which was limited to misrepre-
sentations of origin, to that contained in section 43(a) of the Lanham Act,
indicates that Congress did not intend to limit the statutory cause of ac-
tion to mere palming off."
Finally, an established canon of statutory construction is that
remedial statutes must be broadly construed. 3 The underlying purpose
of section 43(a) is to protect the marketplace from misrepresentation of
products or services in commerce. ' It is, therefore, generally held to be
a remedial statute. 5 The holding of L'Aiglon and its progeny, which fur-
thers the remedial purposes of the Act, is thus appropriate.
' See, e.g., American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63 (1982):
[I]n all cases involving statutory construction, "our starting point must be the
language employed by Congress," and we assume "that the legislative purpose is
expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used." Thus "[a]bsent a clearly
expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be
regarded as conclusive."
Id. at 68 (citations omitted).
61 See supra text accompanying notes 20-22, 32-36.
62 See id.
See, e.g., Payton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332
(1967); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 326 F.2d 575 (10th Cir. 1964);
United States v. One Hazardous Prod., 487 F. Supp. 581, 588 (D. N.J. 1980); R.R. v. Depart-
ment of Army, 482 F. Supp. 770 (D.D.C. 1980).
6 See Johanna Farms, Inc. v. Citrus Bowl, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 866 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); S.
REP. No. 1333, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1946 U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 1274, 1275.
1 See, e.g., Nature's Bounty, Inc. v. Super Drugs Corp., 490 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y.
1980); CBS Inc. v. Springboard Int'l Records, 429 F. Supp. 563 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); John Wright,
Inc. v. Casper Corp., 419 F. Supp. 292 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd in part, rev'd and remanded in
part sub nom. Donsco, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 587 F.2d 602 (3d Cir. 1978); Ames Publishing Co.
v. Walker-Davis Publications, 372 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Geisel v. Poynter Prods., Inc.,
283 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); see also Metric & Multistandard Components Corp. v.
Metric's, Inc., 635 F.2d 710 (8th Cir. 1980); Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop,
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III. CURRENT ISSUES UNDER THE LANHAM ACT
A. Who Has Standing?
Section 43(a) specifically gives standing to "any person who believes
that he is or is likely to be damaged."6 The Ninth Circuit has held, in
reliance on section 45, the definitional section of the Act, that the word
"person" in section 43(a) includes "juristic persons (e.g., firms, corpora-
tions, unions and associations) as well as natural persons." 7
The courts have been liberal in finding standing. An estate was
found to have standing when it asserted a claim against an entertain-
ment group impersonating the decedent without authorization."8 Stand-
ing was also found for an actor when a film distributor replaced his name
with that of another actor in both film credits and advertising material."9
The most significant case indicating a restrictive standing test is the Sec-
ond Circuit's opinion in Colligan v. Activities Club of New York, Ltd.,7 in
which consumers were denied standing." This decision, however, is based
upon improper statutory construction 2 and is bad policy since it
deprives the market of a potential corrective source."
Inc., 234 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1956) (Clark, C. J., concurring).
- 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976).
17 Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 607 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1976)).
The legislative history of § 43(a) makes the standing of "associations" somewhat ambiguous.
Section 3 of the 1920 Trademark Act specifically gave standing to an "association of... per-
sons, or corporation." Trademark Act of 1920, ch. 104, § 3,41 Stat. 533 (1920). One of the early
versions of the Lanham Bill, H.R. 6618, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. § 43 (1939), provided for civil
liability "at the suit of any association of... persons," as did H.R. 82, 77th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 43 (1941), which eventually became § 43 of the Lanham Act. Since the bill, as passed, does
not contain such language, an argument could be made that the language was intentionally
deleted to deny an association standing. However, since the legislative history gives no in-
dication that this was intended, it is probable that Congress assumed the term "person" as
defined in § 45, which includes associations, would be incorporated into § 43(a). See
Derenberg, supra note 7, at 1036; see also Mutation Mink Breeders Ass'n v. Lou Nierenberg
Corp., 23 F.R.D. 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
" Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D. N.J. 1981).
" Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1981). See also Norman M. Morris Corp. v.
Weinstein, 466 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972) (holder of exclusive right to sell misrepresented prod-
uct had standing); D. M. & Antique Import Corp. v. Royal Saxe Corp., 311 F. Supp. 1261
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (distributor had standing); Yameta Co. v. Capitol Records, Inc., 279 F. Supp.
582 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 393 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1968) (musician had standing to
prevent recording company's misrepresentation).
70 442 F.2d 686 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971).
71 See id. at 693-94; accord In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 475 F. Supp. 928
(E.D.N.Y. 1979); John Wright, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 419 F. Supp. 292, 324-25 n.18 (E.D. Pa.
1976), affd in part rev'd and remanded in part sub nom. Donsco, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 587
F.2d 602 (3d Cir. 1978); LeBlanc v. Spector, 378 F. Supp. 301 (D. Conn. 1973); Broward County
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 329 F. Supp. 364 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
7 Rather than accepting the literal meaning of § 43(a) as Congress' intent and requir-
ing the defendant to prove the contrary, the Colligan court put the burden on the plaintiff
to prove that Congress intended to give consumers standing. See 442 F.2d at 692-93.
1 See 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 59, § 27.5B; see also infra text accompanying notes
79-81.
1983]
398 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
1. Consumer Standing
In Colligan, the plaintiffs had purchased a packaged ski tour from
the defendant. The defendant had advertised the package to include ade-
quate ski equipment, qualified instruction, and transportation. In reality,
the equipment was inadequate, there was only one "qualified" instruc-
tor, and the transportation broke down.74
The Colligan court denied standing to the plaintiff. It reasoned that
opening the federal courts to consumer actions "would lead to a
veritable flood of claims brought in already overtaxed federal courts,
while adequate private remedies for consumer protection, which to date
have been left almost exclusively to the States, are readily at hand."75
The Colligan court thus ignored the purpose of the Lanham Act-"to
protect the public from imposition by the use of... false trade descrip-
tions."76
The need for a uniform law on what constitutes misrepresentation in
false advertising, one of the purposes of the Lanham Act," is the same
whether the plaintiff is a business or a consumer. By requiring con-
sumers to seek state court remedies there arises the likelihood of incon-
sistent results depending on the plaintiff's forum. This type of problem
is what Congress intended to avoid in passing the Lanham Act.
The real interest of the Colligan court appears to be that the com-
plaint in that case involved a local matter not generating any national
concerns. A better way to have limited access to federal courts on purely
local matters would have been to require a significant effect on in-
terstate commerce under the .Lanham Act."
Consumers and consumer groups often will have ample justification
to challenge for false advertising. 9 If a significant amount of money,
" See 442 F.2d at 688.
" Id. at 693.
"' See S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1946 U.S. CODE CONG.
SERV. 1274, 1275; see also U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 681 F.2d 1159, 1162 (9th Cir.
1982).
" See S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1946 U.S. CODE CONG.
SERv. 1274, 1277.
" See Tubeco, Inc. v. Crippen Pipe Fabrication Corp., 402 F. Supp. 838 (E.D.N.Y.
1975), affd, 538 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1976); Florida v. Real Juices, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 428 (M.D.
Fla. 1971); Iding v. Anaston, 266 F. Supp. 1015 (N.D. Ill. 1967) (discussing interstate com-
merce standard). That the interstate commerce requirement in other legislation has been
read broadly by the courts does not preclude a narrow reading under the Lanham Act since
"the phrase 'in commerce' does not, of course, necessarily have a uniform meaning
whenever used by Congress." United States v. American Bldg. Maintenance Inc., 422 U.S.
271, 277 (1975).
11 See Gold Seal Co. v. Weeks, 129 F. Supp. 928, 940 (D.D.C. 1955), affd sub nom. S.C.
Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Gold Seal Co., 230 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 829
(1956) (seller can not destroy "the buyer's opportunity to judge fairly between rival com-
modities"); see also Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 467 F. Supp.
366, 374 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding in the commercial context of
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large numbers of people, or the safety of the public is involved, con-
sumers will have a reasonable interest which must be protected." In
fact, there may be instances in which there is no competitor with suffi-
cient economic incentive to challenge an advertising campaign, thus
leaving consumer groups as the sole source of protection for the public.
Should the views of Federal Trade Commission Chairman James Miller
prevail such that the FTC limits its involvement in this area, then con-
sumer standing would become even more imperative."
2. Competitor Standing
In the commercial context, the question of the requisite injury for
.standing under the Lanham Act merges into the issue of whether the
plaintiff has shown a "likelihood of injury" required on the merits. This
inquiry was at the center of the Second Circuit's decision in Johnson &
Johnson v. Carter-Wallace, Inc.'
Johnson's claim arose out of Carter's use of baby oil in NAIR, a
depilatory, and its advertising campaign promoting this component of
the product. Carter added a blue banner containing the words "with
baby oil" to the NAIR label and emphasized this fact in its advertising.
Johnson's section 43(a) claim alleged that Carter falsely represented to
consumers that the baby oil in NAIR had the same moisturizing and
softening effect on the skin of the user as the application of baby oil after
use of a depilatory. Johnson also claimed that the packaging created the
false impression that NAIR was a Johnson & Johnson product. On these
facts, Johnson contended that it was entitled to injunctive relief.83 The
trial court dismissed the claim on the ground that Johnson had failed to
carry its burden of proving damages or the likelihood of damages.84 The
Court of Appeals reversed.85
The Second Circuit first noted that section 43(a) represented a
departure from the common-law action for trade disparagement and
from the need to prove actual damages as a prerequisite for injunctive
that case that "[t]here is no requirement that the defendant's service or product be in direct
competition with, or be of the same type as, the product or service of the plaintiff'); St.
Charles Mfg. Co. v. St. Charles Furniture Corp., 482 F. Supp. 397 (N.D. ill. 1979).
See 1 R. CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 18.2(b)(1),
at 625 (3d ed. Supp. 1980) ("dispositive question" is whether plaintiff "has a reasonable in-
terest to be protected against false advertising"); see also New West Corp. v. NYM Co. of
Calif., Inc., 595 F.2d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 1979).
"I See supra note 3.
2 631 F.2d 186 (2d Cir. 1980). The issue in Johnson, the degree of injury necessary for
standing, is identical to the issue in American Washboard, where the court held that the
plaintiff lacked standing because it could not prove injury. See supra text accompanying
notes 11-14.
'3 See 631 F.2d at 188.
487 F. Supp. 740, 749 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
See 631 F.2d at 192.
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relief. This departure, according to the Johnson court, marked the crea-
tion of a "new statutory tort intended to secure a market-place free from
deceitful marketing practices."88 The minimum requisite likelihood of
damages, according to the Second Circuit, lies somewhere between a
mere subjective belief by the plaintiff that he is injured or likely to be
damaged and a quantifiable loss. The Johnson court held:
The statute demands only proof providing a reasonable basis for
the belief that the plaintiff is likely to be damaged as a result of
the false advertising. The correct standard is whether it is likely
that Carter's advertising has caused or will cause a loss of
Johnson sales, not whether Johnson has cone forward with
specific evidence that Carter's ads actually resulted in some
definite loss of sales."
The first step in applying the Johnson rule is to determine whether
the parties are competitors. The Johnson court concluded that, while the
parties in that case did not compete in the narrow depilatory market,
they did compete in the broader hair removal market.' Johnson's stake
Id. at 189 (citing Alfred Dunhill Ltd. v. Interstate Cigar Co., 499 F.2d 232, 236 (2d
Cir. 1974), and L'Aiglon Apparel v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649, 651 (3d Cir. 1954)). The
Johnson court reasoned that the new tort differed from the common-law action for trade
disparagement in two important respects: (1) it does not require proof of intent to deceive;
and (2) it entitles a broad range of commercial parties to relief. See 631 F.2d at 189.
631 F.2d at 190 (citing Ames Publishing Co. v. Walker-Davis Publications, Inc., 372
F. Supp. 1, 13 (E.D. Pa. 1974)). The Johnson court noted that while plaintiffs need not show
actual damages in order to obtain an injunction, they face a difficult burden in any attempt
to recover damages since such damages would be often speculative or conjectural. The Sec-
ond Circuit's expression of concern over proof of actual damages is identical to that raised
by Judge Hand in Mosler nearly fifty years before. See supra note 17.
No court has awarded damages in a comparative advertising case under § 43(a). See At-
torneys Relishing Ad Wars, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 15, 1982, at 22. Most competitors settle after an
injunction is either granted or denied. See id. One case in which damages may ultimately be
awarded, however, is U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 681 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir. 1982), which
is pending in the United States District Court of Phoenix. The plaintiff has already obtained
an injunction against Jartran's false advertising. See id. Because Jartran is U-Haul's only
significant competitor in the market, it is likely that U-Haul will be able to prove that its
lost sales were attributable to Jartran's advertisements.
Actual and punitive damages have been awarded in the palming off context. See Big 0
Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1977), cert.
dismissed, 434 U.S. 1052 (1978) (actual and punitive damages); Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v.
Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 869 (1976).
A mandatory injunction requiring the defendant to publish corrective advertisements
will in many cases be the most appropriate remedy. See Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562
F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977), modifying, 88 F.T.C. 503 (1976). Such an injunction is necessary
where the defendants' advertisements have created a false and material belief in consumers
which will live on after the advertising ceases. See id, see also Perfect Fit Indus., Inc. v.
Acme Quilting Co., 618 F.2d 950 (2d Cir. 1980); P. Ferrero & C.S.p.A. v. Life Savers, Inc.,
383 F. Supp. 10 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (requiring affirmative action by defendant).
" See 631 F.2d at 190. While NAIR is used for hair removal by depilation, Johnson
Baby Lotion has been promoted as a substitute for shaving cream and is used for removal of
hair by shaving. See id.
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in the shaving market thus gave it a "reasonable interest to be protected
against the alleged false advertising.""
The second step under the Johnson rule is to prove a causal connec-
tion between the alleged false advertising and the plaintiff's own sales
position. The court concluded that Johnson had met this burden by
showing that NAIR's share of the hair removal market had increased
since its baby oil advertising began. The court reasoned that for each
new depilatory user, a corresponding decline in the use of shaving prod-
ucts such as oils and lotions appears probable. The Johnson court also ac-
cepted the plaintiffs contention that the use of baby oil after depilation
is likely to be reduced if Carter's advertising conveyed to consumers the
idea that NAIR's baby oil has a moisturizing and softening effect and
leads the consumer to believe that use of a second, post-depilation,
moisturizer is unnecessary."
In finding for the plaintiff, the Johnson court rejected Carter's argu-
ment that de minimus damages or the failure of the plaintiff to show a
definite amount of lost sales precludes relief. The court's analysis is con-
sistent with numerous circuit and district court precedents. 1
In addition, the Second Circuit correctly held that sound policy
reasons exist for not requiring proof of actual loss as a prerequisite to
obtaining standing for injunctive relief under section 43(a). An inability
to prove monetary damages in an injunction suit, as distinguished from
an action for damages, poses no likelihood of an unwarranted recovery
for the plaintiff. The plaintiff achieves no more than that to which all
competitors are entitled-a market free of false advertising.
92
Had the Second Circuit in Johnson reached a different result, section
43(a) would in many respects have been no better than the rule laid down
in American Washboard. Essentially, the plaintiff under the Lanham Act
" Id. at 190 (quoting 1 R. CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND
MONOPOLIES § 18.2(b), at 625 (3d ed. 1967)).
9 See 631 F.2d at 190. Johnson offered other evidence to support its contention that it
was likely to be injured. Sales of its baby oil had in fact declined. Surveys introduced into
evidence indicated that after viewing NAIR's ads people thought they would not need baby
oil after shaving if they used NAIR and a consumer witness testified that she switched from
using baby oil for shaving to NAIR because it was advertised as containing baby oil. See id.
at 191.
1 See Chromium Indus., Inc. v. Mirror Polishing & Plating Co., 448 F. Supp. 544 (N.D.
Ill. 1978); Rare Earth, Inc. v. Hoorelbeke, 401 F. Supp. 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Mortellito v. Nina
of Calif., Inc. 335 F. Supp. 1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); see also American Home Prods. Corp. v.
Johnson & Johnson, 436 F. Supp. 785 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), affd, 577 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1978);
Hesmer Foods, Inc. v. Campbell Soup Co., 346 F.2d 356 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 839
(1965); Potato Chip Inst. v. General Mills, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 173, 179 (D. Neb. 1971), affd, 461
F.2d 1088 (8th Cir. 1972); American Brands, Inc. v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 413 F. Supp.
1352 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); National Lampoon, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 376
F. Supp. 733 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 497 F.2d 1343 (2d Cir. 1974); Ames Publishing Co. v. Walker-
Davis Publications, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 1, 13 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Mutation Mink Breeders Ass'n v.
Lou Nierenberg Corp., 23 F.R.D. 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). The Second Circuit recently reaffirmed
Johnson. See The Coca-Cola Co. v. Tropicana Prods., Inc., 690 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1982).
'2 See 631 F.2d at 192.
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would only be able to obtain relief in a situation where it had a near
monopolistic position or was the defendant's only competitor. This result
Congress sought to avoid in enacting section 43(a). Congress specifically
declined to include actual damages as an element of a violation of section
43(a). The test, under the Act, is whether there is a likelihood of
damages . 3 The common-law concept of a need for actual damages is,
therefore, inappropriate for incorporation under the "new statutory
tort" of section 43(a).9 4
B. What Type of "Falsity" Is Actionable?
1. Puffing
Courts applying section 43(a) outside the palming off context have
been forced to define what type of falsity is actionable. Statements that
a product possesses superior qualities are often considered mere puffing
and are not actionable. 5 Phrases held to be within this category include
statements that the defendant's product is "far better than any [other]
ever before offered,"96 "new and revolutionary,"97 or "comparable in
quality" to other brands. 8 Where representations go beyond mere puff-
ing there can be liability. The distinction, however, between puffing
" See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976).
" The Johnson court remanded the case to the district court for a determination of
whether the NAIR advertising was false or misleading. The Second Circuit directed the
district court that if it found the defendant's advertising to convey a false message, ir-
reparable injury for the purposes of injunctive relief would be present. The court's reason-
ing on this point is consistent with traditional standards for injunctive relief since in an
open market it is impossible to measure the exact amount of plaintiffs damages. See The
Coca-Cola Co. v. Tropicana Prods., Inc., 690 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1982).
"5 See Gerber Prods. Co. v. Beechnut Life Savers, Inc., 160 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y.
1958). To constitute "puffing" the representation must be of a character that it is "offered
and understood as an expression of the seller's opinion only ... on which no reasonable man
would rely." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 722 (4th ed. 1971). As one early
court said: "The law recognizes the fact that men will naturally overstate the value and
qualities of the articles which they have to sell. All men know this, and a buyer has no right
to rely upon such statements." Kimball v. Bangs, 144 Mass. 321, 11 N.E. 113, 114 (1887).
9 See Smith-Victor Corp. v. Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc., 242 F. Supp. 302 (N.D. Ill.
1965).
', See Lewyt Corp. v. Health-Mor, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 189 (N.D. Ill. 1949), rev'd on other
grounds, 181 F.2d 855 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 823 (1950).
" See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Du Bois Brewing Co., 175 F.2d 370 (3d Cir. 1949), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 934 (1950); see also Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 185 F.2d 58 (4th Cir. 1950);
Kidder Oil Co. v. FTC, 117 F.2d 892 (7th Cir. 1941); Ostermoor & Co. v. FTC, 16 F.2d 962 (2d
Cir. 1927).
" See Western Radio Corp. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 937 (7th Cir. 1965); Kirchner v. FTC, 337
F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1964); Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. FTC, 310 F.2d 89 (1st Cir. 1962); Gulf Oil
Corp. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1945); Skil Corp. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 375 F. Supp.
777 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
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and actionable falsity is an issue of fact that can only be discerned on a
case-by-case basis."'
The most recent decision under section 43(a) discussing a puffing
defense is American Home Products v. Abbott Laboratories.'' The
defendant in Abbott represented its hemorrhoid medication, Tronolane,
as one which "stops pain immediately." Abbott's clinical tests established,
however, only that Tronolane reduced pain over time. Two to five hours
after application, most Tronolane users continued to experience a signifi-
cant proportion of the pain they felt prior to initial use of the product.
The product failed to produce complete cessation of pain in more than fifty
percent of its users.'
The Abbott court found that the essential question before it was
whether the phrase "stops pain immediately" was perceived by con-
sumers to mean total and immediate cessation of pain. In terms of the
puffing defense the question was whether consumers took the advertise-
ment literally or with an acceptance that the representation was made in
the context of an attempt to sell a product.
The defendant argued that in the context of its advertising, "stops"
did not mean "stop"; "rather 'stops pain' can and should be read to mean
stops some pain or some significant amount of pain."' 3 According to the
defendant, consumers understand that "stops" when used in connection
with an advertisement for a pain reliever does not mean the same thing
as "when used in reference to a policeman's stopping a car or Muham-
mad Ali's stopping George Foreman."'' Thus, according to the defendant,
the phrase "stops pain immediately" was both intended to be and
understood to be mere puffing.
Ruling on the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, the
court rejected this argument. The court emphasized that no dictionary
"gives 'partially ceased' or 'partially reduced' or anything synonymous
to those phrases as a definition of 'stop.' ""0 The court reasoned that
while dictionary definitions are not conclusive, they do give the common
meanings of words and thus indicate what the plaintiff will show regard-
" The privilege for "puffing" would appear to be inapplicable as a matter of law where
a seller uses statistics in a head-to-head comparison with other products. In such cir-
cumstances the representation is more than just the seller's opinion. See U-Haul Int'l, Inc.
v. Jartran, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 1238 (D. Ariz. 1981), affd, 681 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir. 1982).
"' 522 F. Supp. 1035 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). The Abbott decision does not describe Abbott's
defense as one of "puffing." Nevertheless, it is that concept which was at issue in the case.
See id. at 1044-45 (that some consumers understood defendant's representations to mean
less than the literal meaning of these representations "is perfectly understandable in light
of consumer skepticism about advertising claims and consumer capacity to accommodate to
exaggeration").
" See id. at 1042.
" See id.
"' Id. at 1043.
105 Id. at 1044.
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ing consumer perceptions at the trial on the merits. Similarly, the court
held that the term "immediately" could not be perceived as meaning two
to five hours."6 The court found further support for its ruling in that
none of the defendant's competitors used the term "stops pain" in
describing the benefits of their products but rather restricted their self-
characterizations to "relieves pain," a term suggested by the Food and
Drug Administration. 7 Finally, the court found persuasive consumer
survey evidence indicating that some consumers believed Tronolane
would end pain immediately.
The court discounted evidence that some consumers understood
"stop" to mean "reduced" on the ground that this fact went only to
damages and not to falsity.08 Thus, the court held that the defendant's
advertisements representing that Tronolane immediately stopped pain
were misleading and in violation of section 43(a)."0 9
The Abbott court's treatment of the puffing defense is consistent
with both congressional intent and the literal words of the Lanham Act.
Congress intended to guarantee a marketplace free of deceitful advertis-
ing, and section 43(a) expressly prohibits all representations "tending"
to describe falsely.1 The fact that consumers receive an advertiser's
claims with skepticism does not alter the fact that a particular advertise-
ment is false or misleading.
Consumer perception of advertising claims is far from irrelevant,
however, as the Abbott court's reliance on consumer surveys indicates.
Surveys have shown that promotional claims which are widely publicized
through television, radio, and print media tend to be particularly per-
suasive. The wide distribution of these advertisements implies review of
their claims by responsible people concerned with liability. Wide
distribution gives these advertisements an aura of veracity quite unlike
the loose language in an individual, and generally unaccountable,
salesman's pitch. Widespread claims also have greater potential to harm
than those of individual salesmen, simply by virtue of the greater
number of people the advertisements may persuade. Thus, the courts
should be cautious in deeming any advertising language aimed at a
significant portion of the public to be mere puffing.
2. Examples of "Falsity"
The courts have held that when analyzing the issue of falsity it is not
necessary for the plaintiff to show that the defendant willfully or inten-
10 See id.
107 See id. The Abbott court also found support for its ruling in evidence that the defend-
ant consciously chose to use the words "stop" and "immediately" so as to "break through
the clutter of other advertising messages in the area." Id.
... See id. at 1045.
1 See id.
11 See supra text accompanying notes 9, 27-30.
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tionally made the false description or representation. The sole issue is
whether consumers are mislead."' If the plaintiff can show that the
defendant deliberately intended to deceive the consumer, the plaintiff
need not prove actual consumer confusion. Once the intent to cause con-
fusion is established, the court will presume that the defendant ac-
complished his purpose.'
The most common falsities violating section 43(a) occur when an
advertisement contains an expressly untrue statement concerning the
quality of the advertised product. Such misstatements have appeared in
a variety of contexts. For example, in Philip Morris Inc. v. Loew's
Theatres, Inc.,"' the court found that the defendant's claim that its
brand of cigarette was a "National Taste Test Winner" was false on its
face because the survey on which the representation was based had in
fact shown that consumers preferred a competitor's brand.1 In Elec-
tronics Corp. of America v. Honeywell, Inc.,"' the defendant was found
to have violated section 43(a) when it falsely represented that its pro-
gramming controls for industrial heaters and burners were inexpensive,
were easy to use, and required minimal supervision by an electrician.' 8
In American Home Products Corp. v. Abbott Laboratories,... the defend-
ant was enjoined under section 43(a) from promoting its medication as
being "new" when in fact the product's formulation had been available
for years."1 In Toro Co. v. Textron, Inc.,"' the defendant was held to
have violated section 43(a) by falsely claiming that its snow plow did not
require priming, was easier to push than its competitor's product, and
had a feature which prevented stalling in drifts. ' An in Quaker State
Oil Refining Corp. v. Burmah-Castreol, Inc.,"' the defendant was held to
have violated section 43(a) by falsely representing that its motor oil did
not lose viscosity."'
. See Parkway Baking Co. v. Freihofer Baking Co., 255 F.2d 641, 648 (3d Cir. 1958);
Ames Publishing Co. v. Walker-Davis Publications, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 1, 11 (E.D. Pa. 1974);
Gold Seal Co. v. Weeks, 129 F. Supp. 928, 940 (D.D.C. 1955), affd sub nom. S.C. Johnson &
Son, Inc. v. Gold Seal Co., 230 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 352 U.S. 829 (1956).
"' See McNeilab, Inc. v. American Home Prods. Corp., 501 F. Supp. 517, 529 (S.D.N.Y.
1980); Johnson & Johnson v. Quality Pure Mfg., Inc., 484 F. Supp. 975 (D.N.J. 1979); Polo
Fashions, Inc. v. Extra Special Prods., Inc., 451 F. Supp. 555, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
511 F. Supp. 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
" See id. at 858.
"' 358 F. Supp. 1230 (D. Mass.), affd, 487 F.2d 513 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
960 (1974).
166 See id. at 1236.
II 522 F. Supp. 1035 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
,, See id. at 1047-49.
' 499 F. Supp. 241 (D. Del. 1980).
See id. at 254.
' 504 F. Supp. 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
' See id. at 180. But see Ragold, Inc. v. Ferrero, U.S.A., Inc., 506 F. Supp. 117 (N.D.
Ill. 1980); Glenn v. Advertising Publications, Inc., 251 F. Supp. 889 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (no false
representation).
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3. Failures to disclose.
Although plaintiffs have been successful in asserting claims for ex-
press falsehoods, they have had less success where the defendant has
omitted facts that might bear on consumer preference. Courts have held
that section 43(a) prohibits only affirmative false representations and
not misleading absences of information.' This line of cases is derived
from the Second Circuit's opinion in Alfred Dunhill Ltd. v. Interstate
Cigar Co.
124
In Dunhill, a manufacturer had shipped across the Atlantic Ocean
268 fiberboard cases of Dunhill brand tobacco. One hundred sixty-eight
of those cases suffered water damage during shipment. Dunhill received
payment for the damaged cases from its insurer who in turn sold the
tobacco to a salvage company for disposition. The defendant purchased
the tobacco, which was labelled "Dunhill," fully aware that the cases of
tobacco were salvaged goods. At the time of the defendant's purchase,
no conditions were imposed upon resale of the tobacco. Dunhill subse-
quently requested the defendant to label the tobacco as salvage. The
defendant refused Dunhill's request, but did circulate a memorandum to
sales personnel advising them that the customers should be warned that
the merchandise was salvage." The tobacco was eventually sold at
retail.
The district court held that the defendant's selling of the Dunhill
labeled goods violated the Lanham Act. Relying on precedent under the
Federal Trade Commission Act, the court reasoned that "[s]ales of
damaged tobacco in tins bearing trademarks associated with high quality
tobacco, without adequate warnings to customers that the goods are
damaged, involve false representation of their quality."'2 The Court of
Appeals reversed.
Three reasons underlie the Second Circuit's decision. First, Dunhill
allowed the damaged goods to be sold in the original packaging without
expressly requiring that the purchaser market the goods as salvage. Ac-
cording to the Second Circuit, Dunhill should have either repackaged the
tobacco or insisted on a restriction on resale as part of the original
agreement with the salvage company. Second, the court reasoned that a
mere failure to disclose is not actionable under section 43(a). Third, the
Second Circuit rejected the district court's reasoning that the unfair
"23 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 429 F. Supp. 407 (C.D.
Cal. 1977); John Wright, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 419 F. Supp. 292, 325 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd in
park rev'd and remanded in part sub nom. Donsco, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 587 F.2d 602 (3d
Cir. 1978).
124 499 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1974).
See id. at 233-34.
" Alfred Dunhill Ltd. v. Interstate Cigar Co., Inc., 364 F. Supp. 366, 372 (S.D.N.Y.
1973), rev'd, 499 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1974).
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trade practice precedent developed by the FTC should be incorporated
into section 43(a).12
The result in Dunhill may be justified on the first of the court's
reasons. Dunhill should not have allowed the salvage company to pur-
chase the tobacco without requiring it to designate the product as
damaged. The second and third rationales of the Second Circuit, how-
ever, are questionable. The reasoning of the Dunhill court that a mere
omission is insufficient directly contradicts the well-established princi-
ple that misrepresentations may result from both the statement of un-
true facts and the omission of facts which create a false impression.
1 28
Further, there is well-reasoned precedent developed under the Federal
Trade Commission Act determining what constitutes consumer decep-
tion, the same principle at issue under the Lanham Act." The Second
Circuit in Dunhill should have found that precedent applicable.3 Failure
to do so deprives trial courts of valuable case law by which to judge
challenged practices.
4. Misrepresentation of Competitors' Goods.
One issue that has arisen repeatedly under section 43(a) is whether
the statute covers only false statements about the inherent qualities of
the defendant's product or whether it also touches disparagement of the
plaintiffs goods. Bernard Food Industries, Inc. v. Dietene Co., 3 ' is the
' See 499 F.2d at 236-38. The Dunhill court refused to incorporate FTC precedent into
§ 43(a) on the grounds that:
The Federal Trade Commission Act does not give competitors the right to sue for
unfair advertising and the Lanham Act does not give anyone the right to sue for
acts which constitute deceptive trade practices but which do not constitute unfair
advertising .... Not every possible evil has yet been proscribed by federal law.
Id. at 237 (emphasis in original).
'" See National Bakers Servs., Inc. v. FTC, 329 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1964); cf. § 10B of the
Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1980). Although Dunhill has not been overruled,
it has been greatly undercut by numerous recent decisions holding that § 43(a) applies not
only to false representations but to statements which are literally true but have the tendency
to deceive. Most of these cases have involved comparative advertising and centered upon
the use of statistical data indicating consumer perception of the defendant's representa-
tions. See Vidal Sassoon, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Co., 661 F.2d 272 (2d Cir. 1981); R. J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Loew's Theatres, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
I" See FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 385 (1965); Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co. v. FTC, 481 F.2d 246, 249 (6th Cir.), cerL denied, 414 U.S. 1112 (1973); In re I.T.T. Con-
tinental Baking Co.,.83 F.T.C. 947 (1973); In re Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23 (1972).
12 The Lanham Act proscribes conduct that results in consumer deception. It is irrele-
vant under the Act whether this deception is caused by false advertising or other unfair
practices. The Second Circuit's creation of a distinction based upon the form of the decep-
tion is erroneous. See SK&F, Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Lab., Inc., 625 F.2d 1055 (3d Cir.
1980).
,3, 415 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 912 (1970). See also In re
Uranium Antitrust Litig., 473 F. Supp. 393 (N.D. IM. 1979). The Bernard court adopted the
Sampson construction of the Lanham Act. See id. at 1283.
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most significant case on this issue. Bernard began to produce an eggless
instant custard in 1964. A Bernard competitor, Dietene, introduced a
custard mix containing egg solids in 1965. Within a few months, Bernard
introduced a similar egg solids custard. In January, 1966, a Dietene
chemist, who later claimed to be unaware of the existence of Bernard's
new egg custard, made a comparison of the Dietene product with Ber-
nard's eggless mix. On the basis of the chemist's report, Dietene
prepared a sheet comparing its product to that of Bernard. The com-
parison sheet showed the "Bernard custard" to be inferior in flavor, tex-
ture, nutrition, and costs to Dietene's Delmar Quick Egg Custard. Thus,
the impression created was that Dietene's product was better than Ber-
nard's product when in fact no comparison had been made between the
two egg-containing custard mixes.
The Bernard court reversed a lower court's decision for the plaintiff
and held that "[flalse advertising or representations made by a defendant
about a plaintiffs product are not covered by § 43(a)." ' According to the
Bernard court, the decisive issue is whether the defendant has
misrepresented its own product. In this case, Dietene's fact sheet dealt
only with claimed deficiencies of the Bernard custard mix; it "[did] not in
any manner assert that Dietene's product has qualities that are found in
Bernard's custard mix."'" This fact, according to the court, was fatal to
Bernard's claim. Since the common law already provided a remedy for
disparagement, the Bernard court did not believe that Congress intended
section 43(a) to be extended to such disparaging advertising.
This rationale is not supported by congressional intent or common
sense. The literal language of section 43(a) shows that Congress intended
the Lanham Act to include disparagement-type cases. In a dispar age-
ment-type case, the defendant has both misrepresented the plaintiffs
product ("a false description or representation"") and put its own prod-
uct in commerce ("use in connection with any goods or service"'35) in
order to reap the benefit of that misrepresentation. The misrepresenta-
tion only has import to the defendant if it increases the defendant's
sales. Accordingly, the defendant in a disparagement action has made a
misrepresentation "in connection with any goods."'35 Had Congress in-
tended to limit section 43(a) to misrepresentations concerning the defend-
ant's own product, it would not have chosen the broad "in connection
with" language.
The Bernard distinction between a defendant misrepresenting its
own product versus disparaging a competitor's puts form over sub-
stance. A false statement by the defendant about a plaintiffs product
11 Id. at 1283.
133 Id.
131 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976).
13S Id.
13 See Skil Corp. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 375 F. Supp. 777, 782 n.10 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
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has the same detrimental effect as a false statement about the
defendant's goods. Both tend to mislead the buyer about the qualities of
the goods and their relative merits. In both instances, the plaintiff has
lost sales and the public has been misled. '
The Bernard court's artificial differentiation between two inter-
related forms of misrepresentation is particularly unworkable in the con-
text of comparative advertising. In such advertisements the defendant
has misrepresented -both the quality of its own goods and those of its
competitor. Comparative advertisements, if false or misleading, are
generally found actionable under section 43(a).111 Under Bernard, a court
would be required to separate the damages caused by each misrepresen-
tation and then allow recovery only for misrepresentations of the adver-
tised product. Any such separation of damages would be highly artificial
and contrary to the remedial purposes of section 43(a).39 Despite these
reasons supporting an opposite result, most courts have elected to follow
the Bernard court's reading of section 43(a).
14 0
IV. COMPARATIVE ADVERTISING
Three questions have been raised by the most recent cases involving
comparative advertising: (1) does an action lie under section 43(a) when
an advertisement is literally true but creates a misleading impression;
(2) does an action lie under section 43(a) when an advertisement accurately
reports the results of consumer tests but the methodology underlying
those tests is questionable; and (3) what must plaintiffs show in order to
demonstrate that an advertisement is misleading? Generally, courts
have favored greater consumer protection in answering these questions.
A. Literally True But Nevertheless Misleading Statements
The Second Circuit in American Home Products Corp. v. Johnson &
Johnson,"' was the first appellate court to address the issue of whether
literally true statements could be actionable under section 43(a).
'" See id.
' See, e.g., Philip Morris, Inc. v. Loew's Theatres, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 855 (S.D.N.Y.
1980); R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Loew's Theatres, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
See Comparative Advertising, supra note 6, at 93.
" See Vibrant Sales, Inc. v. New Body Boutique, Inc., 652 F.2d 299, 303 n.3 (2d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 909 (1982); Ragold, Inc. v. Ferrero, U.S.A., Inc., 506 F. Supp.
117, 124 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Toro Co. v. Textron, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 241, 251 n.20 (D. Del. 1980);
John Wright, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 419 F. Supp. 292, 325 (E.D. Pa. 1976), affd in part, rev'd
and remanded in part sub nom. Donsco, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 587 F.2d 602 (3d Cir. 1978);
Alberto-Culver Co. v. Gillette Co., 408 F. Supp. 1160, 1163 (N.D. Ill. 1976); Holsten Import
Corp. v. Rheingold, 285 F. Supp. 607 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Smith-Victor Corp. v. Sylvania Elec.
Prods. Inc., 242 F. Supp. 302, 310 (N.D. IM. 1965); Gold Seal Co. v. Weeks, 129 F. Supp. 928,
940 (D.D.C. 1955), affd sub nom. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Gold Seal Co., 230 F.2d 832
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 829 (1956).
"1 577 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1978).
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American Home Products (AHP) manufactures Anacin, a compound of
aspirin and caffeine. McNeil Corporation, owned by Johnson & Johnson,
manufactures Tylenol, which in 1976 replaced Anacin as the largest sell-
ing over-the-counter internal analgesic. The lawsuit arose out of two
Anacin advertisements aired shortly after Tylenol became the market
leader. The advertisements represented in part that Anacin is a superior
analgesic for conditions involving inflammation. The advertisement did
not, however, specifically say that Anacin is a better painkiller. AHP
sought a declaratory judgment that the advertisements were not false.'
The district court denied AHP's request and enjoined AHP under sec-
tion 43(a) from publishing, or inducing television, radio or print media to
publish, advertisements containing the challenged representation.'
AHP appealed.
The American Home Products court made clear at the outset that
since the case involved comparative advertising it was distinguishable
from prior precedent under section 43(a).144 AHP argued on appeal that
the district court erred in its reliance on surveys interpreting consumer
reaction to the advertisements rather than focusing solely on the
truthfulness of the representations. These surveys indicated that some
consumers perceived the advertisements as making claims which the
district court had found false. AHP asserted that the advertisements
were true and unambiguous and therefore could not be barred under sec-
tion 43(a) even though some consumers mistakenly perceived a different
and incorrect meaning. The Second Circuit responded by holding that ir-
respective of the literal truthfulness of the claims, the advertisements
were actionable.' The American Home Products court held that the
142 See id. at 162.
.. See id. AHP also complained to the National Advertising Division of the Better
Business Bureau, which has adopted a code of advertising. The AHP protests, however,
were for the most part unsuccessful. Before ABC would broadcast the commercials it re-
quired AHP to change certain language, but CBS, NBC, and the print media continued to
carry the AHP advertisements without alterations. See id. at 163.
." The American Home Products court recognized that:
Comparative advertising in which the competing product is explicitly named is a
relatively new weapon in the Madison Avenue arsenal. These cross-appeals by
two of the leading manufacturers of analgesics-pain relief tablets-raise ques-
tions regarding the permissible boundaries of this novel approach to consumer
persuasion.
Id. at 162.
15 Id. at 165. The American Home Products court based its holding on the conclusion
that:
[Section] 43(a) of the Lanham Act encompasses more than literal falsehoods ....
[W]ere it otherwise, clever use of inuendo, indirect intimatiofis, and ambiguous
suggestions could shield the advertisement from scrutiny precisely when protec-
tion against such sophisticated deception is most needed. It is equally well
established that the truth or falsity of the advertisement usually should be tested
by the reactions of the public.
Id. The Second Circuit also noted that AHP erred in its reliance on the truthfulness of par-
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critical question in such cases is not the literal truthfulness of the adver-
tisement but rather the meaning which persons to whom the adver-
tisement is addressed find in the message. 146
The survey evidence in American Home Products showed that while
the defendant's advertisement may have literally stated only that its
product was better than Tylenol for inflammation and not pain, the con-
suming public failed to distinguish between the two. The surveys showed
that the word "inflammation" triggered an association with pain. Thus it
was predictable that by stressing Anacin's superiority over Tylenol as a
reducer of "inflammation" the consuming public would perceive Anacin
as a superior analgesic.147
The American Home Products court relied on Judge Lasker's opin-
ion in American Brands, Inc. v. R. J. Reynolds, Co."' At issue in that case
was the defendant's promotion that its NOW two milligram tar cigar-
ettes contained less tar than any competitor. The plaintiff had been sell-
ing a cigarette which, although smaller in size than NOW, contained less
than two milligrams of tar.
The American Brands court first rejected the defendant's argument
that section 43(a) applied only in the palming off situation."' The court
then held that the defendant could be enjoined from continuing its
advertisement if the plaintiff demonstrated that consumers construed
the NOW advertisements to mean that NOW cigarettes were lower in
tar than all other cigarettes, irrespective of size.'
Judge Lasker ruled that the perception of an advertisement's
message is more important than literal content. He thus emphasized the
duty of courts to review the results of the consumer surveys rather than
the advertisements themselves.' 5' On the basis of surveys indicating con-
ticular statements within the advertisements. The court concluded that the advertisement
must be viewed in its entirety. See id. (quoting FTC v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d 669, 674
(2d Cir. 1963)).
148 See 577 F.2d at 166.
"' See id. at 168. The Second Circuit also affirmed the district court's holding that the
defendant's claim that Anacin was superior to Tylenol for the relief of pain from inflam-
matory conditions was false. In addition, the court noted that there was credible evidence
that for the conditions expressly mentioned in the Anacin advertisements, Anacin did not
reduce inflammation as claimed. See id. at 170-71.
413 F. Supp. 1352 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
See id. at 1355; supra note 12.
See 413 F. Supp. at 1356.
"' Id. at 1357. The American Brands court observed that:
A court may, of course, construe and parse the language of the advertisement. It
may have personal reactions to the defensibility or indefensibility of the
deliberately manipulated words. It may conclude that the language is far from
candid and would never pass muster under tests otherwise applied-for example,
the Securities Acts' injunction that "thou shalt disclose"; but the court's reaction
is at best not determinative and at worst irrelevant. The question in such cases
is-what does the person to whom the advertisement is addressed find to be the
message?
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sumer confusion the American Brands court held that the adver-
tisements by the defendants violated section 43(a).'52
One of the most expansive readings of section 43(a) came in Vidal
Sassoon, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Co. 5' In the spring of 1980, Bristol-Myers
decided to wage an aggressive new advertising campaign on behalf of its
shampoo product Body on Tap using national television advertisements
starring the high-fashion model, Cristina Ferrare. In the commercial, Ms.
Ferrare, apparently fresh from shampooing her hair, claims that "in
shampoo tests with 900 women like me Body on Tap got higher ratings
than Prell for body. Higher than Flex for conditioning. Higher than Sas-
soon for strong, healthy looking hair."1' 4 These representations were based
upon shampoo tests conducted for Bristol-Myers in 1978 and 1980 by the
independent market research firm, Marketing Information Systems, Inc.
(MISI). The plaintiff alleged that Bristol-Myers' claims were not ade-
quately justified by these tests.
It was undisputed at trial that 900 women did not, after trying both
shampoos, make product-to-product comparisons between Body on Tap
and Sassoon. 5 Rather, MISI used "blind monadic testing" in which
groups of approximately 200 women each tested one shampoo and rated
it on a qualitative scale. 5 ' The scale contained six ratings -outstanding,
excellent, very good, good, fair and poor-and was applied to twenty-
seven attributes such as body and conditioning. The data for each at-
tribute of the tested shampoos were quantified so that a percentage
figure for each qualitative rating could be derived. By focusing on the
top two ratings on the scale and disregarding the lower four ratings,
MISI determined that thirty-six percent of the women who tested Body
on Tap found it outstanding or excellent with regard to "strong healthy
hair" whereas only twenty-four percent of the separate group of women
who tested Sassoon gave it such ratings.'57
The Second Circuit initially noted the dubious propriety of using
blind monadic testing for purposes of comparative advertising. Although
evidence was introduced by the defendant's expert that blind monadic
testing had been used in connection with such advertising in the past,
plaintiffs experts testified that such testing cannot support comparative
15 The advertisements were easily corrected when the defendant changed the represen-
tation to NOW being the lowest tar "king size" or "longer cigarette." See id. at 1358.
661 F.2d 272 (2d Cir. 1981).
Id. at 274. This same theme was used in Bristol-Myers' newspaper advertisements
and in brochures which the defendant intended to mail to over 10,000 households. See id.
" See id. In fact, there was no product-to-product comparison between Body on Tap in
any shampoo mentioned in the advertisement. See id.
' See id.
's See id. Had MISI combined the "very good" and "good" ratings with the "outstand-
ing" and "excellent" ratings, there would have been only a statistically insignificant dif-




advertising claims.'" The falsity in the advertisement, according to the
Second Circuit, was its impression that 900 women had compared the
two products. Sassoon had introduced at trial a consumer perception
study which showed that when the test group answered the question
"how many different brands mentioned in the commercial did each of the
900 women try?," ninety-five percent of those answering said that each
of the 900 women had tried two or more brands.
Based on the evidence produced at trial, the district court issued a
preliminary injunction against continuation of the advertising. '59 On ap-
peal Bristol-Myers argued that the misrepresentations alleged by Sas-
soon were only misstatements concerning the manner in which the tests
were conducted, not the "inherent quality of Body on Tap." Misleading
statements regarding consumer tests methodology, Bristol-Myers
argued, are not covered by section 43(a).
While the Second Circuit agreed that Bristol-Myers had not in so
many words falsely described the quality of Body on Tap, it rejected
Bristol-Myers' conclusion that section 43(a) was inapplicable. The court
held that the alleged untruths concerning the MISI tests were "in con-
nection with" Body on Tap, and as the consumer studies introduced by
Sassoon had shown, Bristol-Myers' use of the tests created the impres-
sion that Body on Tap was superior. In reaching this result, the Second
Circuit refused to limit section 43(a) to express misrepresentations to
the quality of the defendant's product.'60
"I See id. at 275. Several aspects of the shampoo tests were criticized by the Second
Circuit. First, the claim by Ms. Ferrare that 900 "women like her" had tried the shampoos
was misleading. This statement suggests that 900 adult women participated in the test. In
fact, approximately one-third of the "women" were ages thirteen to eighteen. The Second
Circuit indicated that the defendant thus intentionally created the impression that more
"women" were involved in the test than actually were. It noted that the creator of the com-
mercials testified that the advertisement was designed to attract a larger portion of the
adult women market to Body on Tap, a product which had appealed disproportionately to
teenagers. See id.
Second, the court questioned the methodology of the test, noting that Bristol-Myers
had instructed the women who tested Sassoon to use the shampoo contrary to Sassoon's
own instruction and had allowed the women to use other brands while they were testing
Sassoon. The court concluded that these women's responses may not have accurately
reflected a true test of Sassoon. See id.
,5' Bristol-Myers argued that because advertisements are protected by the first amend-
ment to the Constitution, Sassoon should have been required to show more than merely a
probable success on the merits of its claim. The Second Circuit concluded that this argu-
ment was not persuasive. It correctly noted that misleading commercial speech is beyond
the protective reach of the first amendment. See id. at 276 (citing Central Hudson Gas &
Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980)); see also Dallas Cowboy
Cheerleaders, Inc. v. The Pussy Cat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding
that the Lanham Act's content-neutral prohibition of false and misleading advertis-
ing- does not arouse first amendment concerns that justify alteration of the normal standard
for preliminary injunctive relief).
"0 See 661 F.2d at 277-78. The Vidal Sassoon court stated that:
One of the principle purposes of the 1946 revision of the Lanham Act was "[t]o
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The Second Circuit expressly did not hold that every misrepresenta-
tion concerning consumer test results and test methodology can result in
liability pursuant to section 43(a). The holding was limited to depictions
of consumer test results and methodology which are so significantly
misleading that the reasonably intelligent consumer would gain a false
impression of the product's inherent quality or characteristics.16'
The Vidal Sassoon opinion accords with the history and purpose of
the Lanham Act. A competitor should not be able to avoid the purpose of
section 43(a) by shifting his misrepresentation from the inherent
qualities of his product to tests that directly concern those qualities.
Such test results can lead consumers to believe that the defendant's prod-
uct is superior even though an express claim of superiority is not
made.'62 The argument raised by Bristol-Myers in Vidal Sassoon was an
attempt to place form over substance. The Second Circuit's decision
underscores the true test under section 43(a): whether the consuming
public is misled by the defendant's representations of its or its com-
petitors' products.
Most recently, the Second Circuit took the Vidal Sassoon rationale
one step further. In The Coca-Cola Co. v. Tropicana Products, Inc.,'63 the
Second Circuit became the first court to hold actionable under section
43(a) a visual sequence in an advertisement. The advertisement at issue
showed athlete Bruce Jenner squeezing juice from an orange and then
pouring the juice into a Tropicana Premium Pack carton. Coca-Cola,
which sells Minute Maid orange juice, argued that the visual sequence
misled consumers into believing that Tropicana is unprocessed, when in
fact it is typically pasteurized and sometimes frozen before packaging.6
The Coca-Cola court held that "[t]he visual component of the ad
makes an explicit representation that Premium Pack is produced by
squeezing oranges and pouring the freshly-squeezed juice directly in the
carton."'' 5 The court concluded that "[t]his is not a true representation of
modernize the trade-mark statutes so that they will conform to legitimate
present-day business practices ...." We are therefore reluctant to accord the
language of § 43(a) a cramped construction, lest rapid advances in advertising and
marketing methods outpace technical revisions and statutory language and finally
defeat the clear purpose of Congress in protecting the consumer.
Id. at 277. (citations omitted). The Second Circuit noted that nothing in the history of the
Lanham Act speaks to consumer testing. The court recognized, however, that this is hardly
surprising, since the growth in consumer testing for comparative advertising claims has oc-
curred only with the advent of television and increased sophistication of marketing techni-
ques during the 1950's and 1960's. See id.
,.. See id.
12 See R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Loew's Theatres, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y.
1980); see also Country Tweeds, Inc. v. FTC, 326 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1964).
690 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1982).




how [Tropicana's] product is prepared.""' Because the soundtrack of the
advertisement did not correct the misimpression given by the visual se-
quence, the commercial was found actionable.
17
B. Flaws in Methodology
The American Home Products and Coca-Cola decisions emphasize
consumer perceptions as the test of misrepresentation. The R. J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Loew's Theatres, Inc.'68 addresses yet another
aspect of comparative advertising-the problem of questionable
methodology in tests used in comparative advertisements. In Reynolds,
the defendant, Loew's, had tested its Triumph brand cigarette against
the plaintiffs brands. The test was performed in twenty-five suburban
shopping malls throughout the country. Each person interviewed was
asked to smoke a masked Triumph and one of the plaintiffs brands. The
participants were then asked six questions, the first two of which were:
(1) "[The code representing Triumph] has .3 mg. of tar while [the code
representing the competitor] has x mg. of tar. Taking that into con-
sideration which would you prefer?"; and (2) "Comparing the taste of the
two cigarettes, how would you say the taste of [Triumph]... compares to
the [competitor]?"'69 From the results of this survey the defendant adver-
tised Triumph, first as a "National Taste Test Winner" and subsequently
as a "National Smoker Study Winner" which "beat" the plaintiffs
brands in "overall preference.' u 0
Focusing on the claim of "National Taste Test Winner," Reynolds in-
troduced its own survey which indicated that when the interviewed per-
son was not told in the question which cigarettes had the lowest tar
level, Triumph was not found superior. The plaintiff argued from this
that this disclosure in the defendant's study biased answers in favor of
the lower tar Triumph. The plaintiff also introduced consumer survey
evidence showing that the defendant's advertisement conveyed a
message of Triumph's taste superiority when in fact the defendant's
survey tested the smokers' preference based on low tar as well as taste.
On the basis of this evidence the court ruled that Reynolds was entitled
to an injunction barring the defendant from including in its Triumph
166 Id.
167 See id.
'u 511 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). Similar facts were involved in Phillip Morris Inc. v.
Loew's Theatres, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
'" 511 F. Supp. at 872.
170 See id. at 870-72. The plaintiff challenged the methodology of the study on the basis
of the timing and use of the tar disclosure, the inadequacy of participant exposure to judge
the cigarettes, an unrepresentative and biased sample, the possibility of interviewer bias,
"order bias" resulting from the consistent mention of the Triumph code first in questions to
the participants, and the suppression of important test results. See id. at 872.
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advertisements any explicit representation of taste parity or superiority
based on the study.'
The Reynolds court also observed that although the representations
that Triumph was a "National Smoker Study Winner" were not literally
false, the defendant could nevertheless be liable. 7 ' The court concluded
that the representation that smokers had "overall preference" for
Triumph was misleading. The consistent disclosure of tar content before
the test participants were asked which cigarette they would prefer to
smoke had the effect of eliciting responses merely on tar preference and
not "overall preference" as asserted by the defendant. Because independ-
ent studies had shown that smokers' main criteria in choosing cigarettes
were taste and low tar, the court reasoned that the procedure used dic-
tated the test result."3 This aspect of the ruling is consistent with the
vast majority of cases under section 43(a). The consuming public was
deceived and the fact of injury is not altered by the manner of
deception."4
In supporting its ruling, the Reynolds court broke with the line of
cases following Dunhill that found failures to disclose do not violate the
Lanham Act. Responses to two of the six questions asked in the smoker
study indicated that Triumph was not superior to the plaintiffs brands
in "satisfying taste." Focusing on this data, the court observed that
"[o]verall preference in the lexicon of advertisers and smokers of low tar
cigarettes is understood to include taste, and the taste results in the
Smoker Study were only partially disclosed. Failure to disclose a
material aspect of the results, relating to taste, under the circumstances
is misleading."'' Thus, the Reynolds court refused to follow the ques-
tionable limitation of section 43(a) imposed in Dunhill.76
Additionally, the court ruled that limiting participants to those
smokers intercepted at suburban malls failed to produce a nationally
projectable statistical percentage. The court did not rule that all such
studies would be unacceptable but that "because of their 'quick and dirty'
nature, such studies-and ads based on them-must receive particularly
close scrutiny."'77
... See id. at 874.
172 The Reynolds court held:
The claims "national smoker study winner," "beats," and "overall preference"
may be deceptive either because they do not accurately reflect the test results,
because of a problem in the test itself, or both. Furthermore, it is necessary "to
consider the advertisement in its entirety, not to engage in disputatious dissec-
tion. The entire mosaic should be viewed rather than each tile separately."
Id. at 875 (quoting FTC v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d 669, 674 (2d Cir. 1963)).
173 See 511 F. Supp. at 877.
'7' Accord Vidal Sassoon, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Co., 661 F.2d 272, 278 (2d Cir. 1981).
'7' 511 F. Supp. at 876.
'7' See supra text accompanying notes 124-30 (the Dunhill rationale is suspect); see also
Chrysler Corp. v. FTC, 561 F.2d 357 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (involving failure to disclose).
17 511 F. Supp. at 876.
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In American Home Products Corp. v. Abbott Laboratories,178 the
court expressed some hesitancy in evaluating the methodology underly-
ing consumer studies.'79 The plaintiff in Abbott sought to enjoin the
defendant from representing, among other things, that the defendant's
product was preferred by consumers "by more than 2 to 1." After a hear-
ing on plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction, the plaintiff conceded
that it had failed to show that the defendant's claim was literally false.
The plaintiff, however, reserved the right to challenge the test
methodology at the trial on the merits.
In addressing the question of what methodologies provide acceptable
support for claims made in competitive advertising, the Abbott court
held:
To answer that question would evidently involve difficult in-
quiries into test design and execution, and would require
testimony from experts and reference to literature in such fields
as statistics, market research, and psychology. Both parties to
this case, as this court understands them, believe that a court
should be cautious in interfering with advertising claims whose
truth turns on the validity of consumer tests. A legal standard
that permitted enjoining such advertising solely on the basis of a
theoretical challenge to test methodology could lead to unpredict-
able judicial decisions that might severely disrupt the standard
practices of the advertising and business communities. The par-
ties here agreed that a court should require substantial proof of
invalidity before enjoining the advertising of the results of any
test that is colorably valid.80
The court also noted that "[t]o prevail on the merits, the plaintiff must
develop specific criticisms of the way the test was carried out."'81
Evidence of other tests that are both methodologically superior and
practical would not only be relevant but in many instances critical to a
successful challenge. 8 ' These criteria established in Abbott balance the
need to remedy harm caused by representations premised upon er-
roneous tests against the need to keep judicial interference to a
minimum.
C. Plaintiff's Evidence of Deception
The courts' emphasis on corfsumer surveys raises the issue of what
evidence plaintiffs must show to demonstrate that consumers are misled
by the defendant's advertising. Proof that an advertisement is
178 522 F. Supp. 1035 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
,T, See id. at 1038-39; supra text accompanying notes 102-10.
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misleading, as opposed to expressly false, must include a demonstration
that a "not insubstantial" number of consumers perceived the erroneous
implication of the commercial."' 3 The requisite number of misled con-
sumers cannot be quantified since it will vary with the circumstances of
each case. Decisions to date indicate, however, that a claim wrongly
perceived by one percent of consumers will be deemed insubstantial,84
while a misleading representation perceived by fifteen percent of con-
sumers will be deemed not insubstantial.'
The scope of the plaintiffs burden was the focal point of Judge
Lasker's opinion in McNeilab, Inc. v. American Home Products Corp.18
In this case, McNeil, alleged that the defendant's advertisements
created the impression that Maximum Strength Anacin (MSA) is a
"stronger" analgesic than Extra Strength Tylenol. Tylenol was not men-
tioned by name in the advertisements.1 7 The plaintiffs argument was
premised on the fact that Extra Strength Tylenol contains 500
milligrams of acetaminophen, just as much pain reliever as the 500
milligrams of aspirin contained in MSA.88
The McNeilab court first recognized that the Second Circuit in the
earlier American Home Products decision 88 had stated that the critical
evidence in such cases are studies showing consumer perceptions of the
advertisements at issue.' In support of its motion for a preliminary in-
junction, McNeil introduced two studies on consumer reactions to the
commercials. The first study indicated that although the advertisement
did not specifically refer to Tylenol, sixty-three percent of the Tylenol
11 See R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Loew's Theatres, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y.
1980); McNeilab, Inc. v. American Home Prods. Corp., 501 F. Supp. 517, 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
16' See American Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 577 F.2d 160, 165 (2d Cir.
1978).
"I' In The Coca-Cola Co. v. Tropicana Prods., Inc., 538 F. Supp. 1091 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd,
690 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1982), the district court held that on a motion for a preliminary injunc-
tion, a level of consumer confusion below 15% indicates that the plaintiff is unlikely to
prevail at the trial on the merits. See 538 F. Supp. at 1096. The Second Circuit reversed the
district court, holding that the plaintiff was likely to prevail on the merits. See 690 F.2d at
312; see also R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Loew's Theatres, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 867, 876
(S.D.N.Y. 1980).
186 501 F. Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 19801.
167 See id. at 521.
See id. at 525-27.
189 See supra text accompanying notes 141-47.
89 501 F. Supp. at 525. Judge Lasker, in an apparent pull-back from his holding in
American Brands, see supra note 151, refused to limit the court's involvement:
Though the court's own reaction to the advertisements is not determinative, as
finder of fact it is obliged to judge for itself whether the evidence of record
establishes that others are likely to be misled or confused. In doing so, the court
must... rely on its own experience and understanding of human nature in draw-
ing reasonable inferences about the reactions of consumers to the challenged
advertising.
501 F. Supp. at 525 (emphasis in original).
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users who saw the commercial believed it made a direct comparison be-
tween Tylenol and MSA. Sixty-seven percent believed that "based on
what the commercial said," MSA contained more pain reliever than Ex-
tra Strength Tylenol. The second study focused on the advertisement's
use of bar graphs showing MSA as the product with the most pain
reliever. This study revealed that 39.5% of the Tylenol users perceived
a smaller bar in the graphs as depicting Tylenol."' Since Tylenol con-
tains as much pain reliever as MSA, the impression created was mis-
leading.
The defendant's rebuttal was based on expert testimony stating that
the data underlying the plaintiffs studies did not support the percentage
figures quoted. According to the expert, a proper tabulation of the raw
data compiled in the plaintiffs first study "would indicate that a much
smaller portion of the viewers perceived the commercial as making a
claim of analgesic superiority."'' The McNeilab court correctly rejected
this argument on the ground that the defendant's "criticism misses the
point, which is not whether the study provides accurate quantitative
evidence of the proportion of the population that is misled, but whether
it indicates that the challenged commercial 'tends to confuse or
mislead.' ""93
The defendant's expert next testified that the methodologies used in
the studies were flawed. The participants in the first study were shown
the advertisements twice. According to the expert, this caused an
"unusual" kind of concentration unlike that in the real world. The court
rejected this argument reasoning that the sole issue is what is perceived
and not the degree of comprehension. The expert also testified that the
second study was neither based on a projectable sample nor an ex-
perimental design. The court rejected the significance of this contention
on the ground that it "would be well taken if the question before the
court required some sort of quantitative determination of the extent to
which consumers are misled ... [b]ut a qualitative rather than a quan-
titative determination is enough to support a conclusion that an adver-
tisement tends to mislead."'9 4 The thrust of the McNeilab opinion is that
the "not insubstantial" test will be easily met in most instances where
the court perceives the potential for misleading impressions in the sub-
ject advertisement. The exact number of misled consumers will not be
critical.
V. CONCLUSION
The language and legislative history of section 43(a) shows that Con-
,' See 501 F. Supp. at 526-27.
,9 Id. at 527.
Id. (emphasis in original).
,' Id. at 528-29 (emphasis in original).
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gress intended to create a broad federal remedy for unfair advertising.
However, only with recent developments in advertising, particularly the
advent of comparative advertising, have the courts begun to explore the
breadth of section 43(a)'s potential.
It is now well established that section 43(a) reaches all expressed
falsity in advertising irrespective of whether palming off is involved.
The trend is toward applying the section to all forms of misleading
advertising ranging from ambiguous representations based upon test
results to misrepresentations arising from flaws in the tests themselves.
Only a minimal number of consumers need be misled in order to make an
advertisement actionable. A decision by the Federal Trade Commission
to relax its involvement in the area would make the continuance of the
present trend a necessity if the marketplace is to be freed from the
distortions which arise from sellers' misrepresentations.
